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Interpreting International Human Rights Standards -  
Treaty Body General Comments as a Chisel or a Hammer 
Kasey L McCall-Smith   
1 Introduction 
Human rights treaties are standard-setting yet these standards are open-textured and 
evolutionary; therefore interpretative tools must be engaged in order to flesh out the 
true extent of states’ obligations, particularly as these obligations evolve to reflect 
rights in the modern world. The human rights treaty bodies embedded in each of the 
UN human rights treaties are comprised of experts in the field specific to each treaty 
and represent a unique feature of the core treaties in that they are the primary 
interpreters of the treaties at the international level. Human rights treaty bodies have 
contributed a great deal to the development of measurable international human rights 
obligations. Through the functions confirmed by their respective treaties, treaty bodies 
have a range of options by way of which they can inform States Parties about the 
evolving nature of human rights protection. From issuing general comments, to 
appraising states’ periodic reports or reaching final views on individual 
communications – what will be referred to collectively throughout this chapter as 
‘jurisprudence’ – there is no lack of soft law to be found. Though many states often 
ignore treaty body jurisprudence, there is unmistakeable evidence that it is creeping 
into the domestic realm by virtue of increasing reference to this jurisprudence in 
domestic court opinions and policy debates. The persisting question is whether the use 
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of treaty body jurisprudence at the domestic level refines or distorts the development 
of universal human rights standards.  
Human rights treaty bodies are invested by their respective treaties with the 
competence to assess the implementation of treaty obligations. As will be examined 
below, the various methods by which treaty bodies may engage in this assessment are 
outlined in each treaty and the competences of each supervisory mechanism varies, 
albeit only slightly. The jurisprudence produced through the exercise of these 
competencies is a form of soft law that can respond to the legal and social 
environment more flexibly and guide interpretation and state practice in the 
international sphere. In other words, the soft law produced by the treaty bodies is 
norm-filling.1 However, it is when these soft instruments are introduced into domestic 
legal systems that they are truly tested, especially when the instruments are used in a 
peculiar manner.2 The impact of these references sustains the concept of soft law put 
forward by this volume – that treaty body instruments contain rules which are in the 
process of incubation.3 The judicial practices surveyed herein suggest that these 
incubating rules – or more accurately, interpretations of the minimalist binding rules 
found in the treaties themselves – are gaining traction. It also supports the oft-repeated 
maxims that human rights treaties do not exist in a vacuum4 and are ‘living 
instruments’5 which makes evolutionary interpretation necessary.  
                                                 
1 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Stephanie Lagoutte and John Cerone, ‘Introduction: Tracing the Roles 
of Soft Law in Human Rights’,  this volume (Nov 14 draft, p. 10 – TBC). 
2 The same observation can be said of domestic court application of treaty interpretation rules 
generally. See, e.g. Helmut P. Aust, Alejandro Rodiles and Peter Staubach, ‘Unity or Uniformity? 
Domestic Courts and Treaty Interpretation’, Leiden Journal of International Law 27, no. 1, (2014) 75-
112, p. 84. 
3 See Chapter 1, this volume. (p. TBC). 
4 For example, Hassan v. United Kingdom, 29750/09 [2014] ECHR 1162 (16 Sept 2014), para. 77; 
Cyprus v. Turkey, 25781/94 [2014] ECHR 478 (12 May 2014), para. 23; Marguš v Croatia, 4455/10 
[2014] ECHR 523 (27 May 2014), para.129; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [2010] ECHR 1053 
(6 July 2010), para. 131; Francoise Hampson, Working paper submitted pursuant to Sub-Commission 
decision 1998/113, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/28 (1999) (1999 Working paper), para. 13.  
5 Jaloud v. The Netherlands, 47708/08 [2014] ECHR 1292 (20 November 2014), para. 121; O’Keeffe v. 
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This chapter explores the introduction of treaty body jurisprudence into 
domestic legal systems. Specifically, it considers the use of general comments.6 The 
contribution begins with a brief introduction of the treaty bodies as it is the nature of 
these bodies that warrants consideration of their jurisprudence as a legitimate 
interpretative tool. It will then deliver an overview of references to treaty body 
general comments in the case law across a selection of jurisdictions, including the UK 
and South Africa, as well as Europe as a supranational jurisdiction. Finally, it will 
analyse the impact that these domestic engagements with treaty body jurisprudence 
have on the interpretation of international human rights standards. It will consider 
whether the outcome of a court case that has relied upon general comments 
contributes to or detracts from the strength of the treaty body outputs. It is posited that 
in instances where rights are progressively recognised for protection, general 
comments serve as a chisel to aid in refining rights. In instances where the judiciary 
disregards or distorts treaty body guidance, it is suggested that the general comments 
act more as a hammer that weakens a particular right. Thus it is extremely important 
that treaty bodies take special care when drafting their opinions, comments and 
reports, therefore some attention will be given to the issue of treaty body drafting.  
                                                                                                                                            
Ireland, 35810/09 [2014] ECHR 96 (28 January 2014), concurring opinion of Judge Ziemele, para.11; 
X and Others v. Austria, 19010/07 [2013] ECHR 148  (19 February 2013), para.139; Loizidou v. 
Turkey (Preliminary Objections) [1995] 20 EHRR 99, para. 71; Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The 
Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 155; David Kinley and Rachel 
Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 447, ftn. 176.  
6 Throughout this chapter the term ‘general comments’ will be used collectively in reference to both 
general comments and general recommendations as in practice both terms refer to the same form of 
treaty body jurisprudential product. See for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), 999 UNTS 171, 16 Dec. 1966, Art. 40(4): ‘The Committee shall study the reports 
submitted by the States Parties to the present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general 
comments as it may consider appropriate, to States Parties’ (emphasis added). The Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 1249 UNTS 13, 18 Dec. 1979, 
Art. 21(1): ‘The Committee shall…report annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
its activities and may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of 
reports and information received from the States Parties’ (emphasis added). Similar statements can be 
found in each of the core UN human rights treaties discussed in this paper. 
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As an interpretative tool, treaty body general comments enrich the 
understanding of human rights obligations, and it is clear that state organs are 
increasingly willing to entertain these views in order to better define human rights at 
the domestic level. As an increasingly authoritative form of soft law, general 
comments are shaping the way in which domestic courts interpret international human 
rights standards. What is not clear is whether the unwieldy nature of domestic 
interpretations bolster or undermine these standards. 
 
2 Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
Human rights treaty bodies are the embedded international institutions of the UN 
human rights treaties and the primary monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the 
texts’ obligations. All of the treaty bodies review periodic reports and are authorised 
to issue general comments7 as they may consider appropriate. Essential to the 
perceived legal value of the treaty bodies’ jurisprudence is the independent, expert, 
non-political status of the bodies.  
Each of the treaty bodies’ membership election processes is crafted to 
guarantee that an unbiased authority exercises oversight over the universal human 
rights treaties. The treaty body election guidelines seek to achieve equitable 
geographical distribution in addition to representation of different types of 
civilisations and legal systems among the States Parties, which helps ensure that no 
one region or culture dominates. Essential to the execution of their duties is the 
requirement that members act in their personal capacities, not as representatives of 
their governments, despite being nominated by them.  
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
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It has been suggested that experts working together in the international context 
‘can facilitate the resolution of global policy issues by narrowing the range within 
which political bargains could be struck’.8 For example, typical members of the 
CEDAW Committee have been active in the areas of gender equality and women’s 
issues and this is reflected by their curriculum vitae. Picciotto observed that 
‘delegating specific issues to specialists who would deal with them in a depoliticized 
fashion…is a means of implementing policies that have been formulated through 
political processes…[and] understood as a response to the problems of governing ever 
more complex societies’9. The treaty bodies exist to ensure specific rights are 
implemented into a variety of social, cultural and political jurisdictions. The 
combination of a highly varied membership and specialists in the field, both mandated 
by committee election guidelines, provides an essential element of legitimacy to the 
work of the treaty bodies.  Without the treaty bodies supervising implementation, 
human rights treaties would be in danger of becoming merely aspirational. 
 
3 Treaty Body Jurisprudence  
States Parties have a duty of good faith to cooperate with the treaty body as 
recognised by general principles of treaty law.10 It is essential that treaty bodies 
interpret the obligations in light of the domestic situation on the ground, including 
introduction of new law or reconciliation with existing law. The interaction between a 
treaty body and a State Party is very much an exclusive, interactive process and is best 
understood as an on-going dialogue. Thus, treaty bodies function primarily on a 
                                                 
8 Sol Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ International Journal of Constitutional 
Review 6, no. 3-4, (2008): 457-479, p. 459. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969, 
Art. 26. This is also typically noted within each of the treaty texts. 
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bilateral plane.11 The exception to this rule is the practice of issuing general comments 
or recommendations, which are intended specifically to provide useful information to 
all States Parties regarding how convention obligations should be implemented.  
General comments often are viewed as the ‘attendant product’ to guide states 
on the scope of treaty obligations.12 In light of the concerns of many states about 
interference with state sovereignty, the treaty bodies’ obligations to make general 
comments is possibly the strongest language available to indicate that they are 
singularly responsible for guiding states’ compliance with a treaty despite the fact that 
this practice has been repeatedly harpooned by states as an over-extension of their 
powers.13 General comments address the entirety of States Parties, rather than 
individual states as with the communications or periodic reporting procedures, and 
they range from mundane matters of internal treaty body functioning to elucidating 
the appropriate means of protecting particular rights.14  
 
3.1 General comments - evolving practice 
The practice of issuing general comments began in 1981 with the Human Rights 
Committee pursuant to ICCPR Article 40.15 Eight of the nine core UN human rights 
                                                 
11 Sir Nigel Rodley, ‘United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the 
Commission on Human Rights: Complementary or Competition? Human Rights Quarterly 25, no. 4 
(2003): 882-908, p. 887. 
12 Ibid., 906. 
13 See, for example, Observations by the United States of America and the United Kingdom on General 
Comment No. 24(52), UN Doc. A/50/40 (1995); reprinted in Human Rights Law Journal 16, (1995): 
423. 
14 See Rodley, supra note 11, at p. 888; Henry J. Steiner, ‘Individual Claims in a World of Massive 
Violations: What Role for the Human Rights Committee?’ in Philip Alston and James Crawford (eds.), 
The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000): 
15-53, p. 22. 
15 For a more complete overview of the history of general comments see Helen Keller and Leena 
Grover, ‘General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their Legitimacy’ in Helen Keller 
and Geir Ulfstein (eds.), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2012): 116-198, pp. 121-27; Philip Alston, ‘The Historical Origins of the Concept of 
‘General Comments’ in Human Rights Law’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Vera Gowlland-
Debbas (eds.), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality:  Liber Amicorum 
Georges Abi-saab (2001), 763, reprinted in Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, 
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treaty bodies have issued a combined 150 general comments on various aspects of 
their respective treaties.16 These include the CERD Committee17 (35 comments), the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC)18 (35 comments), the ESCR Committee19 (21 
comments), the CEDAW Committee20 (33 comments), the CAT Committee21 (3 
comments), the CRC Committee22 (19 comments, including one draft comment 
published June 2015), the Committee on Migrant Workers23 (2 comments), and the 
newest treaty body to commence operation, the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (2 comments). Most recently, the CEDAW Committee adopted 
General Comment 33 on women’s access to justice in August 2015.24  
The debate amongst observers of the UN human rights regime assigns 
disparate levels of importance to these comments as a form of soft law. Some view 
them as authoritative interpretations of the treaties while others view them as 
unsystematic and unfounded statements deserving no recognition in the law.25 Though 
there is far from consensus on the determination of exactly what legal weight general 
comments carry, it is evident that they have influenced the protection of human rights 
and enriched the human rights dialogue. 
                                                                                                                                            
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (3rd ed.)  (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2008), p. 873 et seq. 
16 As of 3 January 2016.  
17 The treaty body established by Art. 8 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), 669 UNTS 195, 21 Dec. 1965. 
18 The treaty body established by Art. 28, ICCPR. 
19 The treaty body overseeing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), 993 UNTS 3, 26 Dec. 1966, was established by ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17, 28 May 
1985. Prior to the resolution, reports were submitted directly to the UN Economic and Social Council 
pursuant to Article 16 of the Covenant. 
20 The treaty body established by Art. 18 of CEDAW. 
21 The treaty body established by Art. 17 of the Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 465 UNTS 85, 10 Dec. 1984. 
22 The treaty body established by Art. 43 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1577 
UNTS 3, 20 Nov. 1989. 
23 The treaty body established by Art. 72 of the Convention for the Protection of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers and Their Families (CRMW), 2220 UNTS 3, 18 Dec. 1990. 
24 CEDAW Committee, General Comment No. 32 on women’s access to justice, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/GC/33 (2015). General Comment information updated 3 January 2016. 
25 See Keller and Grover, supra note 15, at pp. 118-19.  
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3.1.1 Guiding principles on general comments 
The guiding principles on formulating comments, an amalgamation of the procedure 
and practice that has developed since 1981, indicate that they should be directed to 
States Parties, promote co-operation between States Parties, summarise the experience 
the treaty body has gained reviewing the States Parties’ periodic reports and focus the 
attention of the States Parties on matters that would improve implementation of the 
treaty obligations.26 They are intended to provide ‘significant normative guidance’ on 
aspects of implementation of the treaty.27 Furthermore, the subjects should be limited 
to those involving implementation of obligations related to periodic reports, guarantee 
of the treaty rights, article specific questions or suggestions relating to cooperation 
between States Parties.28 General comments are most often expository in style and the 
language typically reflects the expertise of the treaty body in dealing with the treaty 
obligations under its supervision.29 In maintaining a formula, albeit a vague one, it is 
intended that states will more readily accept comments adhering to the guidelines.   
The lack of a clear definition of ‘general comment/recommendation’ in the 
treaties coupled with the vague guidelines outlines has resulted in diverse subject 
matters ranging from implementation of CERD Article 630 (access to effective 
remedy) to the practice of reservations to the ICCPR31 and CEDAW32. What is 
important to reiterate is that the treaty bodies are carrying out their duties under the 
                                                 
26 See Alston, supra note 15, at p. 876. 
27 Keller and Grover, supra note 15, at p. 124. 
28 Alston, supra note 15, at p. 876. 
29 See, for example, Rodley, supra note 11, at pp. 888-89, discussing the HRC’s general comment on 
ICCPR Art. 7. 
30 See CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 26:  Article 6 of the Convention, UN Doc. 
A/55/18, annex V (2000). 
31 See HRC, General Comment No. 24:  Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or 
accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under 
article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 04 Nov.1994. 
32 See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 4: Reservations, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, vol. II (2008). 
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treaty texts. The issue of transmitting comments, as with many aspects in the human 
rights regime, was left undefined intentionally so that practices could develop as the 
human rights movement spread. However, it is now clear that the practice is firmly 
established and accepted by the majority of States Parties.33  
 
3.2 General comments - points of contention 
The issuing of general comments has traditionally been the point at which states 
articulate opposition to treaty bodies as they often view the practice as going beyond 
the treaty into the realm of developing new law.34 General comments air the problems 
that surface during the review of periodic reports and though they are not state-
specific, the fact that reports and comments are publicly available lends to the easy 
association of themes and, therefore, may be embarrassing to states with less than 
commendable rights records. This, in turn, causes offended States Parties to argue the 
lack of legal basis for the comment.35 Alston appropriately identified general 
comments as a ‘double-edged sword’ for States Parties who launch attacks criticising 
their legitimacy as it not only draws attention to their disagreement with the opinion 
and authority of the commenting committee, but also highlights the committee’s 
interpretation of the controversial right, thus establishing a benchmark for other States 
Parties.36  
Much of the opinion surrounding general comments has turned on the drafting 
and the process by which the comment is adopted;37 comments specifically derived 
                                                 
33 Geir Ulfstein, ‘Law-making by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ in Rain Liivoja and Jarna Petman 
(eds.), International Law-Making: Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers (Routledge, 2014): 249-258, p. 
252.  
34 Keller and Grover, supra note 15, at p. 118. 
35 For example, Observations by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on 
Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24 (52) relating to reservations. UN Doc. A/50/40 
(1995); reprinted in 16 Human Rights Law Journal 423 (1995). 
36 Alston, supra note 15, at p. 763, and p. 874 of reprinted version. 
37 Keller and Grover, supra note 15, at p. 119. 
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from treaty documents have met far less criticism than those that are more creative 
with the execution of a treaty body’s remit. Examples of both can be found in the 
2008 General Comment 3338 of the HRC, which deals with States Parties’ obligations 
pursuant to the Optional Protocol39 to the ICCPR (OP-ICCPR). The HRC notes that 
under Article 2 of the OP-ICCPR that a State Party is obliged to provide the author of 
a complaint with an effective remedy when the Committee determines that there has 
been a violation of the ICCPR. By grounding their statement in the treaty text, States 
Parties are reminded of the obligations to which they have agreed in becoming a party 
to the Covenant. Paragraph 19, by contrast, refers to the HRC’s rules of procedure as 
a basis for implementing interim measures where it is thought that irreparable harm is 
likely to occur before the Committee is able to develop its final views on the 
complaint. Though linked back to its purpose under the OP-ICCPR and obviously an 
important tool, using the rules of procedure as a basis for obliging a state to comply 
with a Committee decision is far weaker than using the actual obligation to which the 
state has subscribed.    
 
3.3 Summary 
A mounting hazard for states, which is equally a windfall for human rights protection, 
is that treaty body jurisprudence often is viewed as a form of developing law and 
increasingly is being cited by domestic courts and regional human rights organs, thus 
incorporating this jurisprudence into the corpus of case law and moving it to a less 
                                                 
38 HRC, General Comment No 33:  The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (2008). 
39 HRC General Comment 34 notes at paragraph 3: ‘The preamble to the Optional Protocol states that 
its purpose is “further to achieve the purposes” of the Covenant by enabling the Human Rights 
Committee, established in part IV of the Covenant, “to receive and consider, as provided in the present 
Protocol, communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set 
forth in the Covenant.” The Optional Protocol sets out a procedure, and imposes obligations on States 
parties to the Optional Protocol arising out of that procedure, in addition to their obligations under the 
Covenant.’ 
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‘soft’ form of law, particularly in common law jurisdictions. This use of treaty body 
jurisprudence may be more appropriately referred to as ‘liquid’ law in the domestic 
context as it aids in filling the gaps in and among the hard law that governs rights 
assessment. In these situations, the legal opinion of a treaty body can be both 
validated by the court and lend legitimacy to existing and future treaty body opinions. 
It is to this phenomenon that this chapter will now turn. 
 
4 General Comments in Domestic Courts 
There is a strong argument to rely heavily on the opinions of the treaty bodies as 
interpretative tools in light of the special nature of both the treaty bodies and the 
nature of the rights their constitutive treaties are designed to protect. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that as far as the codified rules of treaty interpretation are 
concerned, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not mention the 
treaty-specific monitoring mechanisms. Treaty bodies had not begun to operate at the 
time the Vienna Convention was adopted thus it would have had no cause to address 
such mechanisms.40 This underscores the point that international law and human 
rights law, particularly, are dynamic and evolving and thus updates must be 
considered in order to maintain a coherent system. 
The following examines the increasing recognition of general comments as 
interpretative tools by a selection of domestic courts. The caveat, which must be set 
forth from the outset, is that the following is an extremely preliminary overview of the 
                                                 
40 Though the treaty bodies were functioning prior to the entry into force of the Vienna Convention in 
1980. In its Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties the International Law Commission 
specifically recognises the role of treaty bodies in monitoring and determining issues related to human 
rights treaty interpretation, see Report of the International Law Commission on its 63rd session, Guide 
to Practice on Reservations with commentary, UN Doc. A/66/10/Add.1 (2011), 3.2 and 3.2.1. For an 
examination of this competence, see Kasey L. McCall-Smith, 'Reservations and the Determinative 
Function of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies', German Year book of International Law 54, (2011): 
521-564. 
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case law derived from three distinct jurisdictions. It is by no means comparative 
between them, nor exhaustive in any way. Particularly, the following gives a 
perfunctory overview of general comments as introduced into the UK, South African 
and European systems. 
 
4.1 United Kingdom 
The UK is party to CERD,41 ICESCR,42 ICCPR,43 CEDAW,44 CAT,45 the CRC46 and 
the CRPD.47 Thus, opinions stemming from the associated treaty bodies should be 
acknowledged and observed ‘in good faith’ in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, though none of these treaties have been officially 
incorporated into UK law. The trend of referencing treaty body documentation in the 
UK began shortly after the adoption of the Human Rights Act48 in 1998. It, however, 
has taken some time for the products of the treaty bodies to evolve into and become 
accepted as more mainstream interpretative tools in the UK domestic legal system. 
Since the inception of the UK Supreme Court, intermittent reference to the treaty 
bodies has increased and this has trickled down to lower courts in their efforts to 
maintain coherence with the rulings of the highest court.  
Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 largely shapes the assessment of 
human rights and the expansion of rights in the UK. Article 2 provides: 
2 Interpretation of Convention rights. 
                                                 
41 The UK signed on 11 Oct. 1966 and ratified on 7 Mar. 1969. 
42 The UK signed on 16 Sept. 1968 and ratified on 20 May 1976. 
43 The UK signed on 16 Sept. 1968 and ratified on 20 May 1976. 
44 The UK signed on 22 Jul. 1981 and ratified on 7 Apr. 1986. 
45 The UK signed on 15 Mar. 1985 and ratified on 8 Dec. 1988. 
46 The UK signed on 19 Apr. 1990 and ratified on 16 Dec. 1991. 
47 The UK signed on 26 Feb. 2009 and ratified on 7 Aug. 2009. 
48 Great Britain. Human Rights Act 1998: Elizabeth ll. Chapter 42. (1998). London: The Stationery 
Office, ‘An Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.’ 
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(1) A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection 
with a Convention right must take into account any— 
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court 
of Human Rights, 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of 
the Convention, 
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the 
Convention, or 
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the 
Convention, whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or 
tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.  
 
Thus whilst it outlines specifically that UK courts must take into account the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and opinions of other European 
Convention on Human Rights organs, there is no direct reference to jurisprudence 
emanating from the UN treaty bodies. However, this omission has not prevented 
British courts from utilising treaty body jurisprudence in the course of interpreting 
human rights issues that come before them.  
In the early months of 2014 the UK Supreme Court reflected on general 
comments in a handful of cases. For example, Kennedy v the Charity Commission49 
recounted the evolution of the freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR 
and how it has been expanded to include access to information in order to facilitate 
expression, particularly in the context of a public watch-dog.50 The Court noted that 
the European Court of Human Rights relied on General Comment No. 34 in which the 
                                                 
49 Kennedy v the Charity Commission [2014] 2UKSC 20, [2014] WLR 808. 
50 Ibid., para. 186. 
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Human Rights Committee51 (HRC) underscored that ‘the right of access to 
information includes a right whereby the media has access to information on public 
affairs.’52 Thus the Supreme Court ‘confidently conclude[d] that a right to require an 
unwilling public authority to disclose information can arise under article 10’53 
because the right of access goes hand in hand with freedom of expression, as outlined 
in the HRC’s interpretation of Article 19 of the ICCPR. This does not mean that 
limitations cannot be put in place through legislation, such as those limitations 
established by the Freedom of Information Act. It, however, demonstrates that in the 
UK the domestic evaluation of the freedom of expression tracks the interpretation 
provided by the HRC in its general comment. This linkage strengthens and refines the 
shared universal dimensions of the right to free expression.  
Examination of free movement protected by ICCPR Article 12 is a recurrent 
theme on which a multitude of UK courts have looked to the treaty bodies for 
guidance. For example, an administrative judge invoked the HRC’s General Comment 
No. 27 on Freedom of Movement in the 2010 Agyeman case.54  The judge pointed out 
that despite the fact that the ICCPR was not incorporated into domestic law, the 
HRC’s interpretation of the Article 12 freedom of movement in paragraphs 19 and 21 
of the general comment were rights flowing to British subjects by virtue of their 
citizenship.55 Specifically, the focus was the deprivation of the right of a person to 
enter his own country. The dicta of the case recognised that this right is set forth in 
domestic, European and international law, though it is not an unfettered right. As 
outlined in the comment, the interference with an individual’s right to return to his 
                                                 
51 The Human Rights Committee is the monitoring mechanism attached to the ICCPR.  
52 HRC, General Comment 34 – Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), para. 18. 
53 Kennedy supra note 49, para. 190. 
54 Derrick Agyeman v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, CO/8185/2006, [2010] EWHC 2180 (Admin) (11 Aug. 2010), at para. 13. 
55 Ibid., paras. 12-13. 
  15 
country of residence may only be interfered with to the extent that is ‘reasonable in 
particular circumstances’.56 In this case, the Court determined that the claimant in the 
case had to accept that the difficulties with which he dealt in relation to obtaining a 
new British passport. It reasoned that the difficulties were justified in light of the 
security concerns of the age in which we live, even for a British citizen returning 
home. Thus the general comment, once again, was used to refine the outer limits of a 
right by highlighting the restrictions that the state might legitimately employ in the 
protection of free movement.  
Immigration and asylum actions are possibly the most frequent cases to invoke 
the opinions of the treaty bodies in the UK, but this is largely due to the frequency of 
such cases both at the administrative and higher court levels. In 2012, the UK 
Supreme Court examined RT & KM (among others) v Secretary of State57, a series of 
cases revolving around asylum seeking refugees from Zimbabwe who did not only 
claim not to support the current Zimbabwean regime but simply had no political 
views whatsoever. The applicants argued that if returned to Zimbabwe it would be 
necessary for them to lie and profess support for the regime in order to avoid 
persecution in light of the Zimbabwean authority’s view that ‘you are either with us or 
against us’.58 The Court underscored that there was ‘no support in any of the human 
rights jurisprudence for a distinction between the conscientious non-believer and the 
indifferent non-believer’.59 Thus, the Court determined that the claimants should not 
be denied asylum simply because they had no political views nor should the 
alternative to asylum be that the claimants live a lie in their home state simply to 
avoid persecution.  In considering the exercise of the right to freedoms of thought, 
                                                 
56 HRC, General Comment 27: Freedom of Movement, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999), 
para. 21. 
57 RT & KM (among others) v Secretary of State [2012] UKSC 38, [2012] 4 All ER 843. 
58 Ibid., para. 44. 
59 Ibid., para. 45, relying on HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 AC 596. 
  16 
conscious and religion as well as the freedom of expression, the Court tracked the 
HRC’s approach to these rights in General Comment No 22 on Article 18 (30 July 
1993) and in General Comment No 34 on article 19 (12 September 2011). 60 By 
referencing the HRC jurisprudence spanning several decades, the UK Supreme Court 
demonstrates an appreciation for the evolving nature of the right and the multifaceted 
dimensions in which the right may be implicated.61 It is clear that the Court worked to 
maintain a consistent interpretation of the rights involved by paying great deference to 
the rights as outlined in the HRC’s comments. By utilising the HRC interpretation of 
the right to freedom of thought, conscious and religion the Court aids in building a 
broad consensus on the expansive nature of the right.  
Continuing a long line of asylum and immigration cases specifically involving 
children, in early March of 2011 a Civil Court of Appeal judge found that five 
paragraphs of the CRC Committee’s General Comment No. 6 on Treatment of 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin62 were 
particularly relevant in DS (Afghanistan).63 The specificity with which the judge 
referred to the general comment left no room for questioning the importance of the 
comment as a tool for interpreting the validity of government actions. The previous 
month, the Supreme Court had noted in ZH (Tanzania) that the most relevant 
legislation to the question of the effects of deportation on a child was Article 3(1) of 
the CRC. Article 3(1) establishes the ‘best interests of the child’ as the primary 
consideration for all actions involving children.64 Though a different child-related 
immigration/asylum issue was asked than in DS (Afghanistan), both courts relied on 
                                                 
60 Ibid., para. 33. 
61 HRC, General Comment No 22 on article 18 (30 July 1993); HRC, General Comment No 34 on 
article 19 (12 September 2011) 
62 CRC Committee, General Comment No 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children 
Outside their Country of Origin, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6 (2005). 
63 DS (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 305, para. 65. 
64 ZH (Tanzania) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, para. 23. 
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the best of interests of the child derived directly from the CRC and elaborated upon 
by the CRC Committee’s general comments.65 Notably, the ZH (Tanzania) opinion 
also cited the CRC Committee’s General Comment No. 6 and articulated that: 
Exceptionally, a return to the home country may be arranged, after careful 
balancing of the child's best interests and other considerations, if the latter are 
rights-based and override best interests of the child. Such may be the case in 
situations in which the child constitutes a serious risk to the security of the 
State or to the society. Non-rights based arguments such as those relating to 
general migration control, cannot override best interests considerations.66  
With the Supreme Court recognising the CRC Committee’s opinion, it is no wonder 
that the decision created a great ripple effect. Following on from ZH (Tanzania), the 
Mansoor case, in a very similar fact pattern and relying heavily on that case, repeated 
the acceptance of CRC General Comment No. 6.67 The Mansoor decision noted that 
the UK Supreme Court has adopted…   
…the approach recommended by international bodies, including the general 
comments of the rights of the child and the UNHCR guidelines, to the extent 
that a rights-based approach must be brought into being in order to justify 
accumulation of factors which could be said to outweigh the best interests of 
the child as a primary consideration in these cases.68 
 
                                                 
65 DS (Afghanistan), supra note 63, para. 22; ZH (Tanzania) (FC), supra note 64, para. 23. 
66 ZH (Tanzania) (FC), supra note 64, para. 27. 
67 The Queen on the application of Mansoor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 
EWHC 832 (Admin), para. 27, citing UN CRC, General Comment No 6 on the Treatment of 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6 
(2005), para. 86,  
68 Ibid., para. 32. 
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Thus, the progeny of ZH (Tanzania) continues to reinforce the strength of treaty body 
general comments as an integral consideration for interpreting UK law, whether as 
some form of evolving law or as an interpretative tool.  
 The use of general comments by the UK judiciary presented here demonstrates 
that these treaty body products aid in developing a more complete picture of 
international human rights obligations. British courts do not always utilise the chisel 
approach. The Agyeman case could be viewed as diminution of rights in the 
restrictions it places on access to passports. However, human rights are not guaranteed 
unfettered exercise when a legitimate restriction is deemed necessary. The selection of 
cases above highlights the potential for a common interpretation of international 
human rights driven by treaty body general comments.  
 
4.2 South Africa 
In 1995, a South African court opined in the Makwanyane case that both non-binding, 
as well as binding, international law ‘may be used as tools of interpretation’69 in 
keeping with Section 39 of the state’s (now former) Constitution - which is reflected 
in the current Constitution, also in Article 39.70 The 1995 decision provided a list of 
potential sources of international law including instruments produced by the HRC,71 
despite the fact that the state had not yet ratified the ICCPR. At present, South Africa 
is party to CERD,72 ICCPR,73 CEDAW,74 CAT,75 CRC,76 CRPD77 and the ICESCR78. 
                                                 
69 S v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (1995 (2) SACR 1; 1995 (6) BCLR 665), 
para. 35. 
70 Article 39, para. 1, of the current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa reads as follows: 
‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum—;(b) must consider international law; 
and (c) may consider foreign law.’ 
71 Ibid., para. 35. 
72 South Africa signed on 3 Oct. 1994 and ratified on 10 Dec. 1998. 
73 South Africa signed on 3 Oct. 1994 and ratified on 10 Dec. 1998. 
74 South Africa signed on 29 Jan. 1993 and ratified on 15 Dec. 1995. 
75 South Africa signed on 29 Jan. 1993 and ratified on 10 Dec. 1998. 
76 South Africa signed on 29 Jan. 1993 and ratified on 16 Jun. 1995. 
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Since the passage of the 1996 South African Constitution79 the Constitutional Court 
has been particularly willing to utilise general comments in an effort to interpret rights 
stemming from the Constitution’s Bill of Rights (Articles 7-39).  Interestingly, the 
South African courts for many years have tended to invoke general comments of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) most often 
despite only having ratified the ICESCR on 12 January 2015.   
In 2000, the Constitutional Court employed relevant international law, 
including a general comment issued by the ESCR Committee, as a tool of 
interpretation when considering the socio-economic right of access to housing in 
South Africa v. Grootboom80. The Court incorporated paragraph 10 of General 
Comment No. 3 on The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations into the opinion 
verbatim to establish that the ‘minimum core obligation’ is necessary to determine 
whether a state is in violation of its obligations under the ICESCR, as outlined by the 
ESCR Committee. The minimum core obligation was eventually determined to be 
outside the scope of the case.81 The dicta, however, proved useful in subsequent 
examinations of alleged violations of economic and social rights. Many human rights 
observers took issue with the Court for its failure to employ a ‘minimum essential 
level’ of an economic, social and cultural right,82 as outlined by the ESCR Committee 
                                                                                                                                            
77 South Africa signed on 30 Mar. 2007 and ratified on 30 Nov. 2007. 
78 South Africa signed on 3 Oct. 1994 and ratified on 12 Jan. 2015. 
79 Adopted on 18 Dec. 1996 and became effective on 4 Feb. 1997. 
80 South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (4 Oct. 2000). 
81 ‘There may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a 
minimum core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the State are reasonable. 
However, even if it were appropriate to do so, it could not be done unless sufficient information is 
placed before a Court to enable it to determine the minimum core in any given context. In this case, we 
do not have sufficient information to determine what would comprise the minimum core obligation in 
the context of our Constitution. It is not in any event necessary to decide whether it is appropriate for a 
Court to determine in the first instance the minimum core content of a right.’ South Africa v. 
Grootboom, supra note 80, p. 66.  
82 For example, Dennis Davis, ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa: The record of the Constitutional 
Court after Ten Years’ ESR Review 5, no. 5, (2004): 3-7; Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA), 
‘The Women’s Budget’, Budget Brief No. 111, (October 2002),  
http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/10-09_Fondements_Pleniere_Grootboom.pdf  (last accessed 3 
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in General Comment No. 3.83 Effectively the opinion severed an essential component 
of the realisation of economic and social rights identified by the ESCR Committee, 
thereby inhibiting the development of a universal interpretation of the right to 
adequate housing.84 The Court opted for a test of reasonable legislative (and other) 
measures within its available resources to progressively realise the right to housing. 
Whilst in many ways Grootboom was a major victory in the fight to have economic, 
social and cultural rights recognized and substantiated in a court of law, it is a sad 
note that eight years after Irene Grootboom’s ‘victory’ she died in a shack in Cape 
Town without any indicia of her right to housing having been fulfilled. The realisation 
of the right was not achieved in part due to the state’s failure to employ the ESCR 
Committee’s outlined ‘minimum essential level’. 
The ESCR Committee has issued two general comments on the right to 
adequate housing. The Constitutional Court has employed both general comments in 
subsequent efforts to flesh out the duties imposed on the state by Article 26 of its 
Constitution, particularly in relation to displaced individuals. Article 26(1) of the 
Constitution provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing.’ The South African Constitutional right to ‘access’ adequate housing is 
somewhat different than the right as introduced by ICESCR Article 11(1). General 
Comment No. 7, The Right to Adequate Housing,85 was utilised by the Constitutional 
Court in the 2009 Joe Slovo Community86 forced evictions case. It drew upon the 
                                                                                                                                            
January 2015). 
83 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties' obligations, U.N. Doc. 
E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991) para. 10. 
84 It must be acknowledged, also, that the South African right is phrased ‘right to have access to 
adequate housing’ (emphasis added) whilst the international obligation is the ‘right to adequate 
housing’ which some argue are two different concepts.  
85 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 7:  The right to adequate housing  
(art. 11 (1) of the Covenant):  Forced evictions, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), paras. 7, 16. 
86 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes and Others (CCT 22/08) 
(2009). 
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treaty body’s interpretation of appropriate measures to establish the obligation of the 
state to provide housing for those persons subject to a legitimate forced eviction.     
 
[E]victions should not result in people being rendered homeless. And where 
the people affected by the eviction are unable to provide for themselves, the 
[government] must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its 
available resources, to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement 
or access to productive land, as the case may be, is available.87  
 
Comment No. 7 was also used to define the duty of the government, including 
procedural protections, when relocating people under South Africa’s PIE88 policy.89 
Previously, in Mpange v. Sithole,90 the Court had relied upon the ESCR Committee’s 
1991 General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing91 to examine the 
duties imposed on the state by Article 26 of its Constitution with respect to the right to 
adequate housing.92 Particularly the Mpange Court noted the interrelatedness of 
adequate housing and other fundamental rights, such as human dignity, as the ESCR 
Committee outlined in General Comment No. 4.93 Underscoring the relationship to 
human dignity is particularly important in light of the Constitutional Court’s 
recognition of human dignity as the ‘central value of the objective normative value 
system established by the Constitution.’94 It also emphasized the ESCR Committee’s 
stress on the need for effective domestic legal remedies in order to comply with 
                                                 
87 Ibid., para. 32. 
88 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE), Act 19 of 1998. 
89 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v supra note 86, paras. 36-37. 
90 Mpange and Others v. Sithole (07/1063) [2007] ZAGPHC 201 (22 Jun. 2007). 
91 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 4: The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the 
Covenant), UN Doc. E/1992/23 (1991), para. 8,. 
92 Mpange supra note 90, at para. 51. 
93 Ibid., para. 51. 
94 Ibid., para. 53. On this point see Arthur Chaskalson, ‘Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our 
Constitutional Order’, South African Journal of Human Rights 16 (2000): 193-206. 
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ICESCR obligations.95 These references to general comments are a step forward; 
however, the South African experience highlights that domestic use of these soft law 
instruments does not always equate to the successful implementation of a universal 
minimum standard of human rights.  
More recently, in April 2011, the Constitutional Court used HRC General 
Comment No. 396 and ESCR Committee General Comment No. 1397 to frame the 
importance of and basic right to education. The comment further aided the Court’s 
interpretation of a private party’s obligation to not infringe the right of education 
under the Bill of Rights. In Juma Musjid Primary School98 the Court established that 
the Member of the Executive Council for Education for KwaZulu-Natal, a 
representative of the government, failed to comply with the positive obligation to 
‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’99 the right to a basic education despite its 
recognised status as an empowerment right and ‘the primary vehicle by which 
economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of 
poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities.’100  In this 
instance, the treaty bodies’ interpretations helped consolidate the international 
minimum standards required to fulfil the right to education.  
It is not only the South African Constitutional Court that has relied upon 
general comments in pursuit of abiding by Article 39 of the state’s Constitution. In 
2008, the High Court of South Africa relied upon ESCR Committee General 
                                                 
95 Mpagne, supra note 90, at para. 52. 
96 HRC, General Comment No. 3, Article 2 Implementation at the National Level, Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 4 (1994). 
97 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 13, The Right to Education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 
(1999). 
98 Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v. Essay N.O. and Others (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13 (11 
April 2011). 
99 Ibid., para. 45. 
100 Ibid., para. 41, quoting the ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 13, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I). 
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Comment No. 15 on The Right to Water101 - derived from Articles 11 and 12 - to 
determine that ‘the State is obliged to provide free basic water to the poor’102 despite 
there being no express right to water under international or South African law.103 This 
case exemplified the Court’s readiness to recognise the interrelatedness and 
indivisibility of human rights and the fact that gaps related to the realisation of rights 
must often be filled using all available tools of interpretation. 
The courts of South Africa have firmly established the role of treaty body 
jurisprudence as an interpretative tool and indispensable source of law. Though the 
use of general comments has not consistently represented a step forward in the 
universal standard of certain rights addressed by the South African courts, progress 
definitely can be charted. As the courts tease out the true meaning of the protections 
provided in the South African Bill of Rights, the interpretative guidance provided by 
general comments, and other treaty body jurisprudence, will continue to be an 
unparalleled tool.  
 
4.3 Europe as a supranational jurisdiction 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was the quickest to consider treaty 
body jurisprudence as a supporting source in the course of evaluating complaints of 
human rights abuse. This swift uptake can be attributed to the prominence of the 
European Convention on Human Rights104 (ECHR), to which all 47 Council of 
                                                 
101 UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I). 
102 S v Mazibuko (A1246/2006) [2008] ZAGPHC 106 (18 April 2008), paras. 36-37, see specifically 
para. 40. 
103 Ibid., para. 45. The right to water, as indicated in General Comment No. 15, is derived from Article 
11 of the ICESCR, which enunciates a non-exhaustive list of rights that must be insured in order to 
uphold the right to an adequate standard of living. See ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 15: 
The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), paras. 2-6. 
104 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 4 
Nov. 1950, ETS No. 005, 213 UNTS 221, as amended by Protocol Nos. 11 (ETS No. 155) and 14 
(CETS No. 194), entry into force 1 Jun. 2010. 
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Europe Member States subscribe. The ECHR has guided domestic European 
jurisdictions since its adoption in 1950. Both the Council of Europe and the European 
Union, which have an overlapping membership of 28 states, maintain human rights as 
a primary policy objective. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the ECtHR has often 
utilised the soft law promulgated by the treaty bodies in its efforts to normalise the 
interpretation of rights and aid in the development of universal human rights 
standards.   
 As the primary court of review human rights violations in Europe, the ECtHR 
has referred to the opinions of various treaty bodies on many occasions. The cases 
discussed here represent a sampling of those where a general comment was invoked 
as an interpretative tool. In 2014 the ECtHR applied HRC General Comment No. 
20,105 in concert with other international law, in Marguš v Croatia106 to assess the 
issue of the right not to be tried for the same charges and the right to a fair trial in 
light of an amnesty granted to the claimant. Following General Comment No. 20, the 
ECtHR recognised that though some states have granted amnesties for acts of torture, 
such amnesties violate the duty of states under the ICCPR to investigate and prevent 
acts prohibited by ICCPR Article 7. Thus in this instance, the ECtHR utilised the 
general comment to reinforce the need to limit the use of amnesties in order to ensure 
justice for the victims of torture or other prohibited treatment. Marguš represents one 
of a growing line of cases focused on refining the prohibition against torture and the 
multifarious ways in which the breach of the right might be manifested.107   
                                                 
105 HRC, General Comment No. 20: Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, Article 7, 30 September 1992 at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=8&DocTy
peID=11 (last accessed 3 January 2016).  
106 Margus v Croatia, ECtHR (GC) [2014] ECHR 523.  
107 For example, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 56, which examined the 
extent of the prohibition against torture. In the case the Court explicitly referred to concluding 
observations, another form of soft law, by both the Committee Against Torture and the HRC, in 
addition to a General Comment, paras. 107-08, 147-51, 156, and 158. 
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The ECtHR examined the extent to which threats constitute torture in 2010 in 
Gäfgen v. Germany.108 As part of its evaluation the Court referenced a 2001 report by 
the UN Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights. The report 
reminded governments that the prohibition of torture related also to acts that cause 
mental suffering, including intimidation and threats, as pointed out in HRC General 
Comment No. 20.  It also referenced HRC General Comment No. 7109  (which was 
replaced by No. 20) to confirm the importance of the principle of effective protection 
and remedy for victims of torture or ill-treatment, including the inadmissibility of 
statements or confessions obtained by torture or other prohibited treatment.110 The 
impact of General Comment Nos. 7 and 20 continue to resonate in cases throughout 
both the Council of Europe and European Union systems.   
In Baka v. Hungary,111 the ECtHR sat in a unique position as it heard an 
application by one of its former members relating to the independence of the 
judiciary. The Court relied heavily on HRC General Comment No. 32 on the right to 
equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial to outline the international 
guidance on what ICCPR Article 14 required in the context of independence of the 
judiciary and protecting judges from political influence.112 The ECtHR ultimately 
found that Baka’s ECHR Article 10 rights had been violated. In doing so, the ECtHR 
confirmed an international standard for the independence of the judiciary.  
                                                 
108 Gäfgen v. Germany, 22978/05 [2010] ECHR 759 (1 June 2010). 
109 HRC, General Comment No. 7: Torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
30 May 1982 at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=8&DocTy
peID=11 (last accessed 3 January 2016). 
110 Gäfgen v. Germany, 22978/05 [2010] ECHR 759 (1 June 2010), paras. 67, 70-1. 
111 Baka v. Hungary (Chamber) [2014] ECHR 528. 
112 HRC, General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a 
fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), paras. 19-21. 
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The 2005 Hirst113 judgment referred to HRC General Comment No. 25(57)114 
which detailed the requirement that states provide detailed information on any 
legislation that was the basis of suspending the right to vote.115 The case involved 
prisoners’ voting rights in the UK and the Court ultimately held that the UK was in 
violation of ECHR Protocol No. 1, Article 3 due to the broad blanket ban depriving 
prisoners of the right to vote. In another 2005 case, Öcalan v. Turkey, the ECtHR 
recognised the findings of the HRC in Reid v. Jamaica, which were based on its 
General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life)116, as ‘international developments 
concerning the death penalty’.117 Thus the Court noted the changing views of the 
international community at large as set forth by the HRC general comment. 
A distinguishing feature of the ECtHR is its ability to stay on top of the large 
amount of information coming out of the treaty bodies and to employ it without delay. 
One reason for this may be the number of judges – currently four – sitting on the 
ECtHR that formerly served as members of a treaty body.118 It could also be the 
increasing cross-fertilisation of information across international human rights 
mechanisms. Whatever the reason, the ECtHR has demonstrated a deft capacity to 
engage the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies in its navigation of international human 
rights standards.  
For instance, the Court used the 2007 General Comment No. 10 of the CRC 
Committee and the 2008 General Comment No. 2 of the CAT Committee in the 
                                                 
113 Hirst v. United Kingdom, ECtHR (GC), No. 74025/01, judgment 6 Oct. 2005, para. 27. 
114 Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 
115 Hirst, supra note 111, at para. 27. 
116 HRC, General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life),30 April 1982,  
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=8&DocTy
peID=11 (last accessed 3 January 2016). 
117 Öcalan v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC), No. 46221/99, judgment 12 May 2005, para. 60. 
118  Judge Boštjan Zupančič was a member of the CAT Committee (1995-98); Judge Linos-Alexandre 
Sicilianos was a member of the CERD Committee (2002-09); Judge Helen Keller was a member of the 
HRC (2008-11); Judge Iulia Antoanella Motoc was a member of the HRC (2006-13). 
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November 2008 Salduz v. Turkey119 judgment to elaborate the relevant law 
concerning legal assistance to minors in police custody. It expressly incorporated two 
paragraphs of the CRC Committee comment120 and one from the CAT comment121 to 
interpret the extent of Turkey’s obligation to provide assistance, legal or otherwise, in 
cases involving juveniles and the general right of access to a lawyer while in police 
custody. Regarding general comments as interpretative tools, Salduz is particularly 
interesting in that it featured two comments that were issued after the commencement 
of the case, which highlights the evolving nature of the tools that are essential to 
rights protection.   
The use of general comments quite often reflects the interrelatedness and 
indivisibility of human rights as recognised in a broad range of treaties. HRC General 
Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4)122 was used in 2009 to assist in 
determining the legal standard used to measure when a state could claim a legitimate 
derogation to the ECHR. The applicants in the case alleged unlawful detention, which 
was countered by the UK with an argument that it was derogating from certain ECHR 
obligations (as outlined in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001). Primary 
questions in the cases leading to the ECtHR hearing were the actual existence of a 
valid ‘public emergency’ and the duration of the derogation to Article 5 of the ECHR. 
As noted in the Comment No. 29, ‘[m]easures derogating from the provisions of the 
Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary nature.’123 The Court ultimately 
                                                 
119 (ECtHR) App. 36391/02, 27 Nov. 2008. 
120 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 10: Children’s rights in juvenile justice, UN Doc. 
CRC/C/GC/10 (2007), paras. 49, 52. 
121 CAT Committee, General Comment No. 2 : Implementation of article 2 by States parties, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/GC/2 (2008), para.13. 
122 HRC, General Comment No 29: State of Emergency (article 4), UN  
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add
.11CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 
(2001). 
123 Case of A and Others v. United Kingdom, App. 3455/05, 19 Feb. 2009, citing HRC General 
Comment 29, para. 2. 
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held that despite there being a public emergency worthy of derogation and that the 
derogation was not of an unreasonable duration in keeping with accepted law, 
including General Comment No. 29, the ‘derogation measures were disproportionate 
in that they discriminated unjustifiably between nationals and non-nationals.’124 Thus, 
it was necessary to mix and match the various international obligations and standards 
to get to the heart of the breach of the obligation. 
The approach of the ECtHR in referencing a wide range of treaty body 
jurisprudence, as demonstrated in Neulinger, reinforces the common mantra that a 
human rights convention ‘cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted 
in harmony with the general principles of international law.’125 The Neulinger 
decision relied upon HRC General Comments Nos. 17 and 19, among several other 
international documents to tease out the meaning of the ‘best interests of the child’126 
and the decision has resonated across many European states. The position of the 
ECtHR, as well as other supranational human rights courts, is unique in the potential 
for its decisions, and the reasoning articulated therein, to influence the states within its 
regulatory system. Giving pride of place to treaty body instruments as means of 
determining human rights standards at the European level strengthens the ‘soft’ nature 
of this jurisprudence and underscores its value as an interpretative tool.  
 
5 Conclusion 
It is clear that domestic and supranational judicial opinions are referencing the general 
comments of the human rights treaty bodies. Whether introduced by zealous human 
rights defenders, NGO amicus briefs or the judges themselves, it cannot be denied 
that the interpretations of human rights conventions by the treaty bodies are gaining 
                                                 
124 Ibid., para. 181,190. 
125 Neulinger v Switzerland (2010) 28 BHRC 706, para. 131. 
126 Ibid., paras. 49-56. 
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traction in domestic courts. What legal value attaches to the comments in light of this 
phenomenon is less clear. This is particularly true when the comments are employed 
to achieve different aims than then treaty body originally intended or where a court 
opts not to adopt the treaty body’s approach.  
In some instances the use of general comments is norm-filling and aids in 
refining the universal interpretation of human rights. In others, a court’s failure to 
follow the reasoning of the treaty body suggests that the right is subject to alternative 
or selective interpretations. The reluctance of domestic judiciaries to follow the 
international interpretation may shatter the promise of a unified global human rights 
interpretation. However, as the UK cases concerning the approach to immigration and 
asylum cases involving children, discussed above, demonstrate,127 in those instances 
where the highest court in a jurisdiction has opted to use general comments to refine 
the extent of a right it is certain that lower courts will follow suit. Does this indicate 
broadening of the available interpretative tools or should these examples be treated as 
mere throw-away observations? The evolution of the international human rights 
system has occurred in many ways not conceived at its inception in 1948. The impact 
of general comments must be included in this observation and only time will reveal 
the true interpretative power of this form of treaty body jurisprudence.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
127 See discussion of ZH (Tanzania), supra note 64; DS (Afghanistan), supra note 63; Monsoor, supra 
note 67. 
